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Created in the Image of God: 
Man and Abortion 
Robert Siesinski 
In the Book of Genesis, we read 
that God created man in His own 
image and likeness (Gn 1:26f; 
5:1; 9:6).J The inspired author of 
this book uses the expression, 
"image and likeness of God"! 
with a specific didactic aim in 
mind. His intent is to affirm that 
man is the apex of God's earthly 
creation, and has been granted a 
special place in the order of earth-
ly creation; first, in relation to 
other creatures and creations, and 
secondly, in relation to God Him-
self. 1 
This vision of man is not 
unique to Genesis, but rather re-
curs in other books of the Old 
Testament as well. For example, 
the psalmist admirably expresses 
the relation of man to the world: 
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Yet you [Yahweh] have made him 
(man] little less than a god, 
you have crowned him with glory 
and splendor, 
made him lord over the work of 
your hands, 
set all things under his feet, 
sheep and oxen, all these, 
yes, wild animals too , 
birds in the air, fish in the sea 
travelling the pa ths of the ocean. 
(Ps 8:5-8) 
The psalmist, likewise, through-
out his entire corpus, eloquently 
expounds man's manifold rela-
tionship with God. Reading and 
meditating on the psalms, we wit-
ness that a real, dialogical rela-
tionship obtains between man and 
God in prayer. In his prayers of 
adoration, petition, thanksgiving, 
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and praise, man does not merely 
express a formal belief in the ex-
istence of God, but above all ac-
tualizes his faith by turning to 
God as existing for him. 4 Man in 
prayer, as it were, reveals his per-
son, confides his secrets, and en-
trusts his being to God. s 
Elsewhere in the Old Testa-
ment, we are told in what the 
divine image consists. God has en-
dowed man with an immortal soul 
(d. Ws 2:23) and with an intel-
lect and free will reflecting His 
own perfections of understanding 
and willing (d. Si 17: 7). Thus, on 
account of this divine image with-
in himself, man enjoys steward-
ship over all other creatures and 
creations of the world (Gn 1: 26-
30; Ws 9:2f; Si 17:2££). In addi-
tion, and above all, the fact that 
man is created in the image of 
God is the basis for the deduction 
that homicide is immoral: 
He who sheds man 's blood, 
shall have his blood shed by man, 
for in the image of God 
man was m a de. (Gn 9:6) 
The lofty, Biblical vision of 
man as created in the image and 
likeness of God has been the fer-
tile ground and recurrent theme 
of Christian reflection from the 
patristic era to our own times. 
Accordingly, Christian thinkers 
have carefully distinguished and 
analyzed the two notions, image 
of God (imago Dei) and likeness 
of God (similitudo Dei), which 
constitute the essence of the Bib-
lical doctrine. As these two ele-
ments are the integral features of 
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this doctrine, no comprehensive 
and just assessment of it is pos-
sible without a prior appreciation 
and true understanding of each 
component part. 
The imago Dei refers to man's 
basic value as a person. It is a 
value realized by a human being's 
mere existence. In other words, 
we may say that the imago Dei 
constitutes, as it were, the divine-
ly-willed " giveness" of human na-
ture. This "giveness" essentially 
embraces man's endowment with 
an immortal soul and an intellect, 
reason, and free will, which found 
the dignity of the human person. 
These latter mental faculties are 
the cornerstone of man's spiritu-
ality, and give man a certain no-
bility that distinguishes him from 
all other creatures. He, unlike 
other creatures, is capable of be-
coming conscious of his own exist-
ence and discovering his unique 
existential state. Moveover, these 
gifts empower man to develop and 
fashion his environment-indeed, 
to "create" his own world. Thus, 
man truly reflects God and His 
perfections. Of course, it would be 
a gross exaggeration to state that 
man is, in a strict sense, the image 
of God. This overstates man's true 
importance, and obscures the cen-
tral truth of man's creaturehood. 
Only Christ is the perfect image of 
God. Only in Him are all the di-
vine perfections verified. Man is 
no more than a pale, analogous 
reflection of the divine image. 
Thus, Sacred Scripture merely 
states that man is created in the 
image of God. 6 
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If the imago Dei constitutes 
the foundation of man's value as 
a person, the similitudo Dei, on 
the other hand, is the raison 
d'et re or very goal of human ex-
istence.' The similitudo Dei is 
man's free realization and actuali-
zation of his imago Dei. Man's 
reason and free will allow him to 
concert with moral values and to 
take an active role in the moral 
drama of daily life. On this level 
man actualizes his freedom in an 
incomparable way. He attains 
moral perfection through the re-
alization of his potentialities, and 
achieves the most complete de-
velopment of his personality. 
From Christian Revelation we 
learn , however, that man's imago 
Dei has been blemished by sin, 
and that a full realization of self 
depends on man's free coopera-
tion with God's gratuitous grace. 
Man can participate in God's 
goodness, and have his nature 
transformed only if he is receptive 
to the curative and elevating ac-
tivity of grace. 
The Biblical doctrine of man as 
created in the image and likeness 
of God, a perennial object of 
Christian speculation, is, likewise, 
an optimum point of departure for 
synthesizing and evaluating many 
contemporary positions regarding 
the nature and moral significance 
of abortion. Our aim is no more 
than to demonstrate that a clear 
consonance exists between this 
doctrine of man and our reflec-
tions on abortion. ~ The timeless 
value of the Bible's teaching and 
its total relevance and full appli-
cability to today's world and its 
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problems come poignantly to the 
fore in the abortion controversy. 
Erroneous understandings of 
the nature of man and abortion 
appear to fall into two categories. 
First, there are the errors which 
tend to overemphasize the simili-
tudo Dei at the price of a total or 
partial neglect of the imago Dei; 
and, secondly, there are those 
which seem to misinterpret the 
nature of the imago Dei. These 
two categories of errors often are 
interwoven in contemporary spec-
ulat ions on abortion. Further-
more, both classes of errors are 
by and large the bitter outcome of 
the antimetaphysical t hinking of 
the modern age. 
The former type of error is 
typified by Daniel Callahan in his 
book, Abortion: Law, Choice & 
Morality." Dr. Callahan writes: 
Abortion is a n act of killing. the 
violent, direct destruction of poten· 
tial huma n life, a l ready in the proc-
ess of developmen t. That fact 
should not be disguised, or glossed 
over by euphemism a nd c ircumlocu -
tion. It is not the destruction of a 
human person-for at no stage of 
its development does the conceptus 
fulfill the definition of a pe rson, 
which implies a developed capacity 
fo r reasoning, willing, desiring and 
relating to others-but it is the de-
struction of a n important a nd valu-
able form of huma n life.1'iI 
The definition of the human 
person contained in this passage 
is of immediate interest and cru-
cial import. It is a typically 
psychologistic definition of the 
human person, since it restricts 
its attention solely to those as- , 
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pects of personal activity, which 
are the clear manifestations of a 
conscious human person. Dr. 
Callahan's definition, as can read-
ily be seen, implies that a grada-
tion exists among persons qua 
persons according to their "de-
veloped capacities" for distinctly 
personal activities. That is, it 
would seem that a person en-
dowed with fewer intellectual 
gifts and less capable of social 
intercourse is, on this score alone, 
less a person. To continue in this 
line of reasoning, moreover, it 
would appear that if a particular 
human individual were to lack 
these capacities (e.g., a fetus, a 
severely mentally handicapped 
person, an aged senile person, 
etc.) , "it" could not be considered 
a personal being. Therefore, its 
killing could not be properly con-
sidered a homicide. 
This psychologistic conception 
of the nature of the human per-
son, accordingly, necessitates a 
real dualism-as this passage 
from Dr. Callahan's book clearly 
demonstrates-between potential 
human life and fully human life 
or, to employ other terminology, 
between merely human life and 
truly person-al life. Here, it is not 
a question of a simple distinction 
of different aspects contained 
within the human person himself, 
i.e., of those aspects of the human 
person more evidently personal 
(reason, free will, capacity for 
interpersonal relationships, etc.) 
from those more strictly animal [ [ 
held in common with other ani-
mals (digestive and circulatory 
systems, for example). Rather, 
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we are presented with a manifest 
bifurcation between personal and 
non-personal life. 
The psychologistic conception 
of the nature of the human per-
son, however, is based on a funda-
mental misunderstanding. As 
Dietrich von Hildebrand in his 
Ethics 12 skillfully shows, it con-
fuses and identifies the concept of 
the "person" with that of "person-
ality." A personality is someone 
who more fully embodies the idea 
of man. Personality is a qualitative 
notion referring directly to those 
intellectual, moral, and social 
qualities and traits we like to see a 
man possess. But there is never a 
personality apart from an already 
existing personal subject, which is 
the essential precondition for the 
development of a personality. The 
range of possible development 
among personalities is consider-
able, and to classify all the di-
verse types of personalities is a 
formidable undertaking. At any 
rate, a personality, par excellence, 
is necessarily a saint, a person, 
who has fully cooperated with 
God's grace in realizing his simili-
tudo Dei. 
Notwithstanding the true im-
portance and ultimate interest in 
saintly personalities, personhood 
is, nevertheless, the more founda-
tional and basic reality as it is the 
ontological notion referring to the 
being all men share. In other 
words, the notion, "person" refers 
to man's imago Dei, while the 
notion, "personality" ultimately 
indicates the similitudo Dei. Ac-
cordingly, although a noteworthy 
gradation obtains among human 
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personalities-from the awe-in-
spiring, yet humble personalities 
of saints to the more superficial 
and bourgeois ones encountered 
in daily life - no gradation ex-
ists among human persons. All 
human persons, in that they are 
persons, are equal in the eyes of 
God. 
The apparent, non-metaphysi-
cal approach underlying the psy-
chologistic conception of the 
nature of man merits attention. 
This stance unilaterally empha-
sizes man's unique processes and 
activities, and neglects his more 
fundamental being. Consequent-
ly, its understanding and appraisal 
of the nature of man tends to re-
main on a purely functional level. 
This fact plus the concomitant 
failure to marvel at and appre-
ciate the primordial aspects of the 
simple being of man not infre-
quently favor the drawing of an 
unwarranted conclusion : namely, 
only those human individuals ac-
tually engaging in these distinct-
ly personal activities and func-
tions or with the immediate ca-
pacity to do so are truly men or 
really human persons. If a greater 
attentiveness to man's being were 
present, on the other hand, one 
would be more reluctant to de-
prive a particular human being 
(e.g., a fetus or a senile man) of 
personhood merely owing to the 
lack of certain processes indIca-
tive of "functioning" human per-
sons. 
This same w e a k n e s s also 
plagues the various sociologistic 
approaches to the nature of man. 
Ashley Montagu J3 typifies this 
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school of thought when he writes: 
. .. the embryo, fetus and newborn 
of the human species, in point of 
fact, do not really become func-
tionally human until humanized in 
the human socialization process. 
Humanity is a n achievement, not 
an endowment. 
In a word, a person is no more 
than a function of society. Hu-
manity is not an intrinsic dignity, 
but merely a dignity (like a tro-
phy, perhaps) conferred by so-
ciety to a possible human subject 
granted its sufficient social devel-
opment. Before the conferment of 
humanity by society, presumably, 
the killing of this subject would 
not be a homicide. 
Clearly, the same confusion 
symptomatic of the psychologistic 
conception is at work here. Per-
sonality once again is mistaken 
for the person. Once more, certain 
aspects of man, like his essential-
ly social nature and his capacity 
to engage in interpersonal rela-
tionships, receive exclusive atten-
tion. However, these aspects, 
though undeniably true marks of 
the nature of man, nonetheless 
denote a more fully developed 
man alone. It is, therefore, invalid 
to give them the sole considera-
tion and attribute an absolute 
value to them. Otherwise, a dual-
ism analogous to the one implied 
by the psychologistic understand-
ing of the nature of man obtains. 
Human individuals subsequently 
fall into two categories: those in 
a pre-social, and therefore pre-
human or pre-personal state and 
those socialized, i.e., the "true 
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men" or "real persons." 
The critique of the psycholo-
gistic and sociologistic concep-
tions of the nature of man is both 
simple and the same. Their dual-
istic separation 14 of human indi-
viduals into pre-social, potential 
human persons, on the one hand, 
and fully humanized or true hu-
man persons,l S on the other, pre-
sents an inescapable and unsolva-
ble dilemma. How does one know 
In a non-peremptory manner 
when the difference becomes 
manifest? That is, how does one 
fix the point between the two 
stages without arbitrariness? In 
short, is it not impossible to find 
a criterion to deterinine what is 
"authentically" hum a nan d 
"truly" personal which does not 
completely beg the question in 
the first place? 
Finally, there are those errone-
ous views concerning the nature 
of man, which appear to refer 
more directly to the imago Dei in 
that they do not mistake "per-
sonality" for "person" in their 
treatment of this question. For 
synthetical purposes, we may 
designate these views the overly 
biologistic or mechanical concep-
tions of the nature of man. The 
center of the debate gravitates 
around one's particular interpre-
tation of the phenomenon, life it-
self. To express this issue more 
immediately in terms of the abor-
tion controversy, the chief ques-
tion is whether the life present in 
the embryo and the fetus (at 
least in its initial stages) can be 
justly considered human life. 
The following objection is fre-
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quently raised: human life can 
not possibly be present in the 
zygote, the embryo, and the fetus 
(again, at least in its initial 
stages) , since no brain is yet pres-
ent. 16 As this physical organ is the 
necessary condition for man's ra-
tional activity by which he is dis-
tinguished from mere animals, no 
human life obtains until the ex-
istence of a brain is verified in the 
fetus. This objection, however, is 
based on a faulty understanding 
of the process of growth witnessed 
in living phenomena as it presup-
poses a mechanical understanding 
of organic growth. 
In this line, the noted abortion 
advocate, Dr. Paul Ehrlich states 
that a "fetus isn't a human being; 
it's a potential human being. Re-
ligious objectors [to abortion] are 
confusing the blueprints for a 
building with the building it-
self."1 7 This analogy, however, is 
fallacious. Insofar as a process of 
growth is described, no significant 
correspondence whatever is to be 
found between a blueprint and a 
fetus. 1s A blueprint never trans-
forms itself into a building; it 
never becomes an integral part of 
the building it represents. True, 
contractors do enlist blueprints 
as aids, but they construct build-
ings with timber, stone, mortar, 
etc. The zygote, on the other 
hand, does in fact organize, de-
velop, and transform itself into an 
embryo. A comparable process of 
internal growth occurs in the em-
bryo, the fetus, and the child un-
til the adult individual results. 
Obviously, when we employ the 
terms, zygote, embryo, fetus, and 
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child in describing a process of 
growth, we are not referring to 
different individuals as such, but 
rather to different stages of 
growth witnessed in anyone in-
dividual organism. All the mate-
rial supplies used in constructing 
buildings, on the other hand, do 
enjoy separate existences before 
the construction of the completed 
building. 
In sum, if a fetus is considered 
human in a later stage of growth, 
it is difficult to understand why 
it could be less human or not hu-
man at all in an earlier period of 
its existence. Considering hu-
manity in an organic perspective, 
therefore, it is not evident why a 
special significance should be at-
tributed to the appearance of the 
brain. Human individuals, after 
all, do not roll off a production 
line upon the assemblage of a 
brain. 
Some authors19 sharing this in-
terpretation and critique of the 
mechanical understanding of hu-
man life would use it to support 
the theory of the immediate ani-
mation of the human soul in the 
zygote, i.e., that there is truly 
human life in the zygote from the 
moment of conception. Others, 
notably Joseph Donceel, S.J. ,2" 
in an interesting twist of thought, 
see in this critique of the me-
chanical conception of human life 
a confirmation of its contrary, the 
theory of the mediate animation 
of the human soul. In other 
words, these latter support the 
position that the humanity of the 
conceptus comes at some later 
date. 
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Fr. Donceel favors a change in 
terminology, however. He prefers 
instead to speak of "immediate 
animation" and "delayed homini-
zation."21 According to his usage 
of these terms, no one places in 
doubt the fact of the immediate 
animation of the zygote with life. 
The point in great dispute, on the 
other hand, is whether this living 
cell is immediately human. Fr. 
Donceel supports the view that 
the hominization of the conceptus 
occurs at a later date, i.e., is de-
layed. 
In the various critical exposi-
tions of the mechanical concep-
tion of human life-be they those 
supporting immediate hominiza-
tion or be they those upholding 
delayed hominization-however, 
there seems to be more or less 
universal agreemen t on one point, 
namely, that a Cartesian-dualist 
metaphysics implicitly underlies 
this view. This dualism holds that 
man is composed of two separate 
substances, the soul (the thinking 
substance of the mind) and the 
body (an extended substance ). 
The interpretations of this dual-
ism vary, however. On the one 
hand, employing the dualist sche-
ma of man as a mind in a ma-
chine, one could argue that such 
a dualist vision tends more to fa -
vor delayed hominization since 
the infusion of the human soul 
into a ltlOre completely organized 
body would be analogous to pour-
ing gasoline into a completed mo-
tor, not yet in operation. Accord-
ingly, the humanity or the "func-
tioning humanly" of an individual 
can come about only once the 
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body is sufficiently organized 
physically and thereby capable of 
receiving the "fuel" of the human 
soul. 
But, to go in the opposite di-
rection, one could legitimately 
challenge the validity of this dual-
ist argument, and, thus, deny the 
truth of its conclusion, delayed 
hominization by attacking and re-
jecting the soundness of the 
analogy employed to sustain it. 
One could object, as I do, that no 
analogy from mechanics can do 
complete justice to the phenome-
non of human life or mere life 
(i.e., not qualified as human) for 
that matter, since it cannot suf-
ficiently take into account the 
specific note of all living phe-
nomena, their organicity. In this 
line, one could reasonably argue 
for immediate hominization by 
noting that a living human indi-
vidual, on account of his organi-
city, is a con tin u u m, i.e., a 
continuous whole whose stages 
cannot be radically separated and 
juxtaposed. Thus, an embryo is 
not merely an embryo, or a fetus 
nothing more than a fetus. In re-
ality, an embryo or a fetus is 
what he is to persist to be and be-
come. 
On the other hand, one could 
argue, as in fact Fr. Donceel does, 
that the Cartesian view, on the 
contrary, more readily corrobo-
rates the theory of immediate 
hominization and not delayed 
hominization. The case for this 
position is as follows : in Cartesian 
dualism, the human soul may be 
considered the efficient cause of 
the human body. Accordingly, the 
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human soul as a separate, spirit-
ual thinking substance is capable 
of inhabiting, as it were, an un-
organized body (the extended 
substance of the zygote), and, 
then, proceed to develop this po-
tential human body into an actual 
human body in much the same 
way as a sculptor molds clay into 
a statue. Clearly, the immediate 
hominization of the zygote is en-
tirely plausible in this under-
standing of the relation of the 
human soul to the human body. 
But, Fr. Donceel rightly count-
ers this position by disclaiming 
the validity of the analogy that 
the soul is the "sculptor" of the 
body. In effect, it equates human 
beings with mere artifacts. Fr. 
Donceel instead upholds Thom-
istic hylomorphism and its teach-
ing that the human soul is the 
formal cause or substantial form 
of the human body. In this sys-
tem of thought, form (a structure 
or intelligible unity having no 
power as such) and matter are 
essentially correlative notions. 
The form, consequently, can 
emerge and exist only in matter 
sufficiently developed and dis-
posed for it.22 In other words, the 
soul as a formal cause does not 
form or produce the body, but 
rather is the first act of this or-
ganized body. Applied to man, 
this means that the human soul 
can exist only in a highly devel-
oped body (i.e., one with a brain). 
The zygote and the embryo, 
therefore, cannot be animated by 
a human soul as their substantial 
form, since no highly organized 
body is yet present. At most, they 
43 
are animated by plant and sensi-
tive souls later transformed into 
a human soul. 
To clarify this complex, meta-
physical thought, Fr. Donceel 
makes use of several analogies. 23 
In Cartesianism, the soul as ef-
ficient cause is related to a body 
much like the sculptor is to a 
statue or an architect or a blue-
print is to a finished building. Hy-
lomorphism, however, in its con-
ception of the soul as a formal 
cause, relates the human soul 
(whence humanity) to the body 
in the same fashion as the shape 
of a statue is related to the statue 
itself or the shape of a building 
(its "building-ness") to a com-
pleted building. In other words, 
just as the essences, "statue-ness" 
and "building-ness" are not reali-
ties apart from existing statues 
and buildings, so also "human-
ness" or humanity is present only 
in sufficiently organized human 
bodies. 
Thus, the zygote or the embryo 
with its virtual or potential hu-
man body possesses humanity 
only potentially. It achieves true 
humanity only after the develop-
ment of an actual human body. 
To elucidate this point, a deflated 
baH analogy is developed by Fr. 
Donceel. His argument may be 
paraphrased as follows: just as a 
deflated ball contains merely a 
virtual sphericity, and acquires 
actual sphericity only after hav-
ing been inflated, in a like fash-
ion, the zygote and the embryo 
possesS' a virtual or potentia! hu-
manity alone, and receive the sub-
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stantial form of man (i.e., actual 
humanity) only upon the devel-
opment of a highly organized 
body. 
An objection to Fr. Donceel's 
thesis, however, must be raised at 
this point. Does Fr. Donceel, in 
fact, overcome the chief defi-
ciency of the Cartesian-dualist 
view, namely, that it overlooks 
the organicity of man and mis-
takes him for a mere artifact? 
Has he actually presented an ade-
quate account of the nature of 
man and the phenomenon of hu-
man life? I think not. The analogy 
of the statue, building, and ball 
are all borrowed from the inani-
mate world. Whatever may be the 
correct metaphysical interpreta-
tion of their reality,24 it is an er-
ror to think an interpretation 
which suffices to describe inani-
mate phenomena is, likewise, ade-
quate for explaining the nature of 
living phenomena. Life is a 
unique, irreducible phenomenon , 
and organicity is an univocal no-
tion. No analogy to objects or 
realities in the realm of the non-
living, therefore, can place the re-
ality of an organism into proper 
relief. After all, the process of 
" growth," which occurs when air 
is pumped into a deflated ball to 
make it an inflated one hardly 
parallels the growth of a living 
human organism from an embryo 
into a fetus and a fetus into a 
child. The former process is no 
more than a mechanical proce-
dure of an individual inflating a 
ban with a pump! But the latter, 
however, is an entirely immanent 
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process of growth of an actual 
human organism developing all its 
potentialities. 
In the end, this approach for 
upholding the delayed hominiza-
tion of the conceptus seems to 
hinge upon "appearances:" if the 
fetus looks human, it is human: 
otherwise, no. Moreover, how can 
it resolve the differences of opin-
ion concerning the biologically 
edifying point mar kin g the 
boundary between a potential and 
an actual human being? Some 
may say the traces of a rudi-
mentary brain suffice for humani-
ty. Others may argue for the 
presence of a structurally com-
plete brain. Still others may pre-
fer that the spinal cord also be 
present along with a complete 
brain. But then, are we not in the 
same dilemma that ineluctably 
confronted the psycho logistic and 
sociologistic approaches? Does 
not any attempted solution neces-
sarily entail begging the question? 
No, the biologistic, psycholo-
gistic, and sociologistic concep-
tions of the nature of man are 
artificial frameworks creating 
many, insolvable pseudo-problems 
regarding the line of demarcation 
between actual and potential per-
sons or between merely human 
life and authentically personal 
life. In reality, no such line exists. 
To conclude briefly, it appears 
necessary to reject the solutions 
offered by the biologistic, psy-
chologistic, and sociologistic at-
tempts to explain the problemati-
cal nature of man, the person, and 
human life along with the theory 
0'£ delayed hominiza:tion. In> their 
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stead, I suggest that there is a 
strong need for the development 
of a personalist metaphysics,2·; 
which would be more consonant 
and faithful to the sublime, Bibli-
cal vision of man as created in the 
image and likeness of God. Two 
points26 call for special develop" 
ment, first, the Marcelian notions 
of being and having, and second-
ly, the relation of potentiality to 
actuality. In a personalist per-
spective, certain pivotal insights 
are more readily grasped and ca-
pable of being deepened, as for 
example, - the primacy of being 
over having, the fact that a person 
mayor may not have a personali-
ty, the truth that potentiality is 
a kind of actuality, the fact that 
the zygote has the being of the 
brain which the fetus subsequen~ 
ly has, etc. 
Simultaneously, one particular 
moral attitude must become more 
widespread and developed, name-
ly, reverence.!' Reverence is the 
response to the call of being it-
self, and only in a reverent atti-
tude can one attain a true know!." 
edge of being and grasp and ap-
praise the values grounded in be-
ing. Reverence, moreover, is the. 
most effective antidote to utili" 
tarianism, since only in a reverent 
attitude does one realize that the 
value of being comes from God 
and is subtracted from the ar~ 
bitrary, egoistic desires and utili-
tarian motivation of man. 
In the abortion controversy, 
reverence to life acquires speciaJ 
import. No adequate assessment 
of the value of each individual 
human being is possible without 
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reverence. When confronted with 
the biologistic, psychologistic, and 
sociologistic conceptions of man 
with their dualistic separation of 
human individuals into potential 
and actual persons, one can not 
help but suspect that, in the final 
analysis, the really determining 
factors for deciding whether a 
particular individual merits hu-
manity are more often than not 
utilitarian considerations alone. 
The only sure remedy to the abor-
tion crisis is reverence. 
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